Tag: journalism

  • Mourning that which never was

    Eddie Glaude, Jr., holds a mirror up to America. Look, he tells us, look! How often I have heard him on television, invited to the camera by Nicolle Wallace to lament another American tragedy and sin: racist murders, the shooting deaths of mere babies, the abuse of immigrant children, the bigotry of the president. Do not say that this is not us, he demands. This is us. This is America. The italics are his. Unless and until we, we white Americans, acknowledge and absorb that truth, he tells us, we cannot and never will move past it. 

    Glaude’s new book, America, U.S.A.: How Race Shadows the Nation’s Anniversaries, is that mirror, reflecting the worst of our reality in sharp detail. He uses the moment of the nation’s already spoiled 250th anniversary to look back on earlier birthdays, on earlier assertions of an American ideal that were always in fact claims to a white America. Those claims have met their lowest ebb in Donald Trump and his klan’s brazen denials of the nation’s racism and any remedies. Diversity is as much as illegal. Racism is now the de facto law of the land. 

    His book is a stunning, damning indictment and conviction of our nation. I cannot recommend it more highly. Best yet, I commend you to listen to the audiobook, read by Glaude. More than once over the years, at the beginning of a Princeton term, I have wandered through the downstairs stacks in my favorite bookstore, Labyrinth, to see what texts are being assigned in the classrooms across the street. I always stop at the shelves filled with those selected by Prof. Glaude, wishing I could sit in his class and learn. To hear him read this book is to witness his teaching. 

    While I was listening to the book, I joined Julie Roginsky and Michelle Kinney for our every-Friday lament about the state of news and media in the podcast we call Breaking the News. What was most broken last week was, of course, CBS. As we were cursing the murder of 60 Minutes at the hands of Bari Weiss and the Ellisons, Michelle said something most wise: that sometimes, rather than wishing to recapture what is lost, we must simply mourn it. 

    Yes, 60 Minutes is the dead show walking. CBS News is already dead. CNN is likely doomed. The Washington Post might as well be buried. The New York Times fails us constantly in the face of fascism. Sinclair is brainwashing towns across the nation, where hedge funds have ruined most every newspaper. Ultimately, I contend, it is mass media that is dead and doesn’t know it. I no longer think it is worthwhile to wonder how to fix it. Instead, I mourn it and ask what will replace it. 

    In this context, I brought up Glaude’s book and said that he forces me to mourn not an America that was but an America that never was: a fantasy of the nation. 

    My grandparents were, frankly racist. And so I was proud of my parents for raising my sister and me to recognize and reject their way of thinking. But what my parents wanted to replace it with in my mind was the American myth of the melting pot. It was too many years later that I saw the inherent falacy in the contention that harmony would come at the expense of identity and history, as if we in power, we white Americans, would ever admit others into our pot of privilege. To be colorblind, as was the aspiration of the time, was to be blind to history, to the effects of racism and the benefits of our own birth. 

    Just as I see that in my own field, to which I have devoted fifty years of my life, it is fruitless and ultimately delusional to think there ever was something better to return to, so I understand that an America of principles can only be built anew, following the full realization of what it was and still is. Each must be replaced.

    What Glaude forces his readers to do is to face the reality of racist America, the crusade to declare the U.S.A. a white nation and to exclude all others. He calls us to a radical new birth. It is brilliantly written, forceful in its poetry, unflinching in its honesty, demanding in its teaching. 

  • Don Newhouse

    I am terribly saddened at word of the death of Donald Newhouse, the last great gentleman of the newspaper business.

    Soft-spoken, unassuming, humble, kind, and generous, Don Newhouse was at the same time a publisher of vast experience, universal respect, and great strength. I had the great privilege of working for him via his sons, Steven and Michael, at various tasks in the newspaper, magazine, cable, and book arms of the media empire he built with his brother, Si. I entered at a moment of volcanic change in our industry, starting in 1994, just as the commercial browser was introduced and the company decided to forego Prodigy, AOL, et al for this new world wide web.

    One clear memory of mine is sitting at a table in Don’s unpretentious Newark office in the Star-Ledger with the family members who oversaw the newspapers, each of them traveling to a different paper and city each month. Thus they were called “The Travelers.” That day, one of the many new competitors to newspapers for their long-lucrative classified business, Monster.com, had reported declining earnings. Don would brook no gloating. He pounded the table to get attention and announced sternly, “People! It’s not coming back.” While others in the industry maintained false hopes, Don was clear-eyed and strategic about the future. He bravely invested in that future.

    Under Donald, Steve, and Michael, Advance cut its own path. While others in the industry made online an afterthought next to their legacy newspapers, Advance set up separate companies so their digital entities could explore and exploit every advantage of the internet — experimenting with new models for content and business. We established new brands, including NJ.com and Cleveland.com (URLs the company had the foresight to grab). We were the most interactive of any newspaper-related sites; it was Steve who taught me the value of conversation and connection — more than content — online. Don once told a friend of mine, “Jeff learned everything he knew from Steve.” True that.

    It is hard to imagine that there was a time when no one could be sure whether this online/internet thing would last. Just as newspapers, magazines, and books jockeyed for advantage in the early industrialization of American media at the turn of the prior century, so in its digitization at the turn of this century, it was not clear whether print or digital would emerge triumphant. But there came a time when the victor was clear. After I left Advance in 2005 to help start a new journalism school at CUNY, I was brought back to work on a daring project in Ann Arbor.

    Another memorable day was spent in a large conference room at Condé Nast’s Times Square headquarters as executives presented the owners with various scenarios for the future of print: what happens if circulation falls by X percent or advertising by Y. It was there and then that Donald and his family and managers decided to take the brave step of making Ann Arbor their first digital-first market, turning the company’s outlet in town into a fully online entity with a newspaper as an ancillary product. Eventually, most every newspaper company would follow Advance’s lead. It was a wrenching decision. I recall witnessing the courage and poignance of that moment. Here was the beloved newspaper company Donald and Si and their generation had inherited from their father and founder, Sam: a precious family heirloom. They loved their newspapers, their histories, and everything they stood for. But as I said, Don was a strong and strategic executive who knew he had to preserve the company and the journalism, not necessarily the presses.

    Don was not just a dedicated publisher but also, of course, a doting husband to his beloved Sue, who died in 2015, father to Steve and Michael, and grandfather as well. Other media dynasties have failed to pass down their companies and knowledge to following generations. Not the Newhouses. I watched with enduring admiration as Steve and Michael continued every day to respect and learn from their father, carrying on not just the business but the values and experience that made them and their company stand apart. I am forever grateful for every lesson I learned in turn.

  • Pope Leo and human intelligence

    Pope Leo XIV’s encyclical, Magnifca Humanitas, is a learned, wise, eloquent, and useful document that is only partly about artificial intelligence. Its lessons should be helpful to many modern institutions — including my own, journalism.

    For those expecting the Pontiff to declare holy war on AI and Silicon Valley, they will be disappointed. Those who wish to claim AI as a new religion will be similarly bereft. Apart from a few timely and almost obligatory references to children and screens, this is not a document influenced by the moral entrepreneurs seeking to inflate and exploit fears of technology. Though it calls for regulation, it does not attempt to prescribe statutes. This is a document intended for generations, to inform our discourse as we manage secular upheaval. I will quote liberally, though I recommend reading it in full. 

    Leo opens with an apt Biblical metaphor, contrasting the Tower of Babel with the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem. Babel was a doomed project of immense hubris, constructing a tower to the heavens. “It was an impressive feat: a single language, a single technology, a single direction,” he writes. “However, the project concealed a profound danger: It was a project conceived without reference to God, supported by uniformity that eliminated diversity and that chose homogenization over communion.” That does sound familiar these days. 

    The rebuilding in Jerusalem, on the other hand, was undertaken following prayer and permission with the people of the city collaborating through acts of listening and communion. Leo’s encyclical is a profound testament to the value of community — a lesson I try to teach to students of media. 

    Leo goes to pains to make clear that “technology should not be considered, in itself, as a force antagonistic to humanity.” Quoting Pope Benedict XVI, he continues, “On the contrary, it has formed part of our history since the beginning as ‘a profoundly human reality, linked to the autonomy and freedom of man.’” He continues:

    Technology has the power to heal, connect, educate and protect our common home; but it can also divide, exclude and generate new forms of injustice. In the abstract, technology in and of itself is not a solution to humanity’s problems, just as it is not inherently evil. In practice, however, technology is never neutral, because it takes on the characteristics of those who devise, finance, regulate and use it. Therefore, the primary choice is not between a “yes” or “no” to technology, but rather between constructing Babel or rebuilding Jerusalem; between a power that claims to dominate the heavens and a people who work together in the presence of God to rebuild the walls of fraternal coexistence.

    He calls for technological innovations, including AI, to “be evaluated by asking a crucial question: Do they truly help individuals and peoples to become more humane and fraternal, while respecting our common home and future generations?”

    Leo warns of unprecedented control by private, transnational corporations that monopolize “expertise, data, and decision-making authority;” and of the “risk of being misled by deceitful goals, such as the prospect of a technology that promises to free us from all weakness;” and of the danger that “persons end up being reduced to a means of achieving results, a resource to be used and exploited, and are no longer recognized as a proper end in themselves who should never be instrumentalized.” He prescribes the means to instead claim agency and shared responsibility to build for the common good, “so that humanity will never lose its beauty.”

    The civilization of love will not arise from a single or spectacular gesture, but from the sum total of small and steadfast acts of fidelity that serve as a bulwark against dehumanization. For this reason, it is worthwhile pausing to reflect on some aspects of how we, each in our own way, can cooperate in building the civilization of love. Without presuming to exhaust this theme, I would like to propose five paths toward daily and public responsibility: the need to disarm words, building peace through justice, adopting the perspective of victims, cultivating a healthy realism and reviving dialogue and multilateralism.

    Generously quoting his predecessors to trace the history of the Social Doctrine of the Church — from Rerum Novarum through the Second Vatican Council to Pope Francis — Leo lays his foundation with sets of principles that guide the Church as a model for other institutions: “listening, dialogue, and service … the dignity of every person, the cohesion of communities, and the good of all … the contributions of philosophy and of the human and social sciences … the importance of listening to scientific research and of encouraging a serious and honest debate among experts while welcoming a diversity of opinions … justice … Understanding that the truth is a gift to be shared, not a possession to be monopolized.”

    As a journalist, that last observation on truth struck me. Journalists like to think they traffic in truth and — especially now in fights with AI companies over copyright — publishers claim ownership of it. Shouldn’t news organizations follow the same advice Leo gives to technology companies: that “truth is a gift to be shared, not a possession to be monopolized…. In this way, the truth of the Gospel is not imposed from above, but grows over time within the concrete interweaving of lives, communities, and cultures. This is not a truth that fears diversity, but instead welcomes and guides it. It does not eliminate conflicts, but transforms them, reuniting that which history tends to scatter.” Truth is too precious to hoard or sell.

    In discussing the power of technology companies, I believe Leo is also, if unwittingly, describing the exclusionary power that mass media have wielded over the last century: 

    These entities effectively set the conditions for access, determine the rules of visibility and shape the very possibilities for participation. When such power is concentrated in the hands of a few, it tends to become opaque and evade public oversight, increasing the risk of distorted forms of development that give rise to new dependencies, exclusions, manipulations and inequalities.

    It is not until halfway into his encyclical that Leo directly addresses artificial intelligence and “the danger of humanity becoming a victim of its own achievements,” saying he does not intend to offer a comprehensive treatment of the technic but wishes to “ensure that it will always be human intelligence, with its conscience and freedom, that guides technical innovations and responsibly determines their use and limits.” 

    Nor does Leo try to define artificial intelligence, though by examining — and defending — human intelligence, he defines what it is not. 

    [W]e must avoid the misconception of equating this type of “intelligence” with that of human beings. These systems merely imitate certain functions of human intelligence. In doing so, they often surpass human intelligence in speed and computational capacity, offering tangible benefits across many fields. Yet this power remains entirely tied to data processing. So-called artificial intelligences do not undergo experiences, do not possess a body, do not feel joy or pain, do not mature through relationships and do not know from within what love, work, friendship or responsibility mean. Nor do they have a moral conscience, since they do not judge good and evil, grasp the ultimate meaning of situations, or bear responsibility for consequences. They may imitate language, behavior and analytical skills, or even simulate empathy and understanding, but they do not understand what they produce, for they lack the affective, relational and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom. Even when these tools are described as capable of “learning,” their way of doing so is different from that of a human person. It is not the experience of those who allow themselves to be shaped by life and grow over time through choices, mistakes, forgiveness and fidelity. Rather, it is a form of statistical adaptation based on data and feedback, which can be very effective, but does not imply inner growth.

    In his rejection of the claims of machine sentience, consciousness, or — God save us — life, I am on Team Leo: this is impossible, technically and definitionally. I am grateful to see the Pontiff directly reject transhumanism (“the enhancement of human beings through technologies — such as biomedicine, body engineering, devices and algorithms”) and posthumanism (which “challenges anthropocentrism and envisions a hybridization of human beings, machines and the environment, even anticipating a threshold where humanity surpasses itself in a new evolutionary stage”). In short: playing God. These are the quasireligious beliefs of some AI cultists, bundled into the acronym #TESCREAL (Google it). Leo further also calls out media for credulously covering these claims.

    These perspectives form the ideological background present in some centers of technological power and occupy the collective imagination in a simplified form, especially in the media and on social networks. They tend to foster enthusiasm for new technologies through a futuristic vision of an “enhanced human being” or “human-machine hybrid.”

    Therein hangs the odious stink of eugenics.

    If the human being is treated as something to be perfected or surpassed, it becomes easier to accept that some lives are less useful, less desirable or less worthy. In the name of progress, “necessary sacrifices” may begin to be justified, placing the burden on the most vulnerable in pursuit of a supposed optimization of the species. In this regard, the aforementioned warning of Saint Paul VI retains great foresight: indeed, scientific and technological advances, when detached from moral and social progress, end up turning against humanity. For this reason, a clear distinction must be made. It is one thing to integrate technology within a human-centered, relational vision; it is quite another to be guided by an outlook that devalues human limits and promises a purely technical form of “salvation.”

    So it is well and good — necessary, actually — that Leo examines the nature of human life and collective humanity in the context of AI.

    When we embrace the possibility of transcending ourselves through God’s grace, we do not deny our nature, nor do we become less human. On the contrary, as Pope Francis explained, “We become fully human when we become more than human, when we let God bring us beyond ourselves in order to attain the fullest truth of our being.” Herein lies the radical departure from Promethean dreams: what saves humanity is not enhanced self-sufficiency, but a relationship that liberates, a communion that transforms. In this light, a technology that merely classifies and optimizes what already exists can, however unintentionally, become an obstacle to change and growth. For an algorithm, an error is a flaw to be corrected; for a person, however, an error can be a catalyst for profound change. A person’s future is not calculable, but depends on one’s freedom — elevated by the inexhaustible grace of God — and on the relationships cultivated.

    In his exploration of artificial intelligence and its effects, Leo returns to the subject of truth in the context of democracy, noting that disinformation has been around long before the accelerating technology of AI. “Truthful information,” he observes, “does not arise from centralized or automated control.” Again, the lesson is not just for AI but for mass media, which has been centralized and controlled since its mechanization and industrialization at the turn of the prior century. (That is the subject of my upcoming book, Hot Type.)

    Then Leo adds an observation that leaves me applauding: that truth in public discourse “is deeply relational, built through bonds of trust and shared practices, as well as an honest exchange with others and with the world. Only the shared pursuit of the veracity of facts, perceived as a common good, can provide a solid foundation for just communication.” 

    In my research for my prior book, The Web We Weave, I researched what people did to ferret out truth before the invented institutions of editing and publishing imbued the technology of print with authority. I came across the concept of FAMA — Latin for “it is said,” the root of the words “fame” and “infamy” — a social system of maintaining one’s reputation for credibility as source, subject, object, or teller of information. Our print institutions turn out to be inadequate to the scale of speech today, so out out of necessity, we are are left to return to such a system of social responsibility. We as a society are out of practice with judging truth on our own, having been told it could be handed to us by media that claimed ownership. That was always an abdication of responsibility. “Indeed, dialogue is an ordinary part of human life,” says Leo. “It involves acquiring an attitude that seeks to forge bonds of fraternity built on listening, an open demeanor, making time for each other and even wasting time together.”

    I am gratified that Leo cites Arendt on the subject. “Indifference to the truth leads, slowly but surely, to a descent into totalitarianism. As the philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote, the ideal subjects of such regimes are not so much those who are ideologically convinced, but rather ‘people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist.’” He adds: “When people come to believe that nothing is genuinely true and that principles are hollow words, then the fuse in their hearts is lit for new eruptions of intolerance and aggression.”

    I am also tickled to hear Leo sounding positively McLuhanesque when he discusses “an ecology of communication,” recognizing, in terms James Carey might approve of, that communication “is not only the transmission of information, but it is also the creation of a culture.” This is the premise of my book, The Gutenberg Parenthesis: that before and after the age of print — both in the time of FAMA and in the age of the internet — public discourse and public opinion are emergent from the public, rather than imposed upon a mythical, monolithic mass. How we use these tools and powers again is up to us. 

    Leo has much to say about the value of education and schools in the age of AI: “We must learn, then, how to exercise restraint in the use of AI and to protect our young people from the promise of the perfect machine, from that subtle temptation which renders human thought seemingly superfluous precisely when it is most needed.”

    He has much to say about technology in the economy, decrying “finance for its own sake” and the metric of GDP, which neglects “aspects essential to the overall wellbeing of people and the environment. He cites Pope Francis, who denounced

    the growing dominance of a technocratic paradigm in our globalized world: the tendency to let the logic of efficiency, control and profit alone shape personal, social and economic decisions. This makes it clear that technology is not simply a tool. When it becomes the standard by which everything is judged, it begins to dictate what matters and what can be discarded, reducing creation to an object of exploitation and human beings to mere cogs in a system driven toward ever greater efficiency.

    And he worries about the dignity of work — including that which goes into the making of AI — and makes clear that the Church has long supported labor and unions. 

    Today, the convergence of automation, robotics and AI is rapidly transforming the very structure of work. It is said that this will bring great improvements for everyone. In reality, however, the “new ways” of working are not necessarily better, for “while AI promises to boost productivity by taking over mundane tasks, it frequently forces workers to adapt to the speed and demands of machines, rather than machines being designed to support those who work. As a result, contrary to the advertised benefits of AI, current approaches to technology can paradoxically de-skill workers, subject them to automated surveillance and relegate them to rigid and repetitive tasks. The need to keep up with the pace of technology can erode workers’ sense of agency and stifle the innovative abilities they are expected to bring to their work.” Precisely in order to avoid this drift, it is necessary to design systems that are centered on the human person and not solely on performance.

    Some in AI-Land argue the solution to a de-skilled and unemployed workforce is universal guaranteed income. Leo would seem to disagree. 

    For these reasons, work is not simply an instrument; it expresses and enhances the dignity of our lives. It is a requirement of the human condition, a normal path toward maturity, development and personal fulfilment. In this regard, financial assistance to the poor may at times be necessary in emergencies, but it cannot become the sole response, since the goal is to enable each person to live with dignity through his or her own work.

    The Vatican invited a co-founder of Anthropic to speak alongside the Pope, On the one hand, Anthropic presents itself as the good AI company, its leaders standing on conscience to prevent their tools being used as autonomous weapons of death. It promises that its models’ behavior will be aligned with its “constitution.” Then again, I have long argued that to believe an AI model can be imbued with ethics, let alone guardrails, is a fool’s errand, for — just as with Gutenberg’s type — there is no way to anticipate and prevent every possible malign use of a technology. It was, after all, movable type that opened the door — did not cause but made possible — the Reformation. Ethics cannot be baked into a machine; ethics must inform our use of it. Leo writes:

    It is not enough to invoke ethics in the abstract; robust legal frameworks, independent oversight, informed users and a political system that does not abdicate its responsibility are required. Otherwise, change will be governed only by technocratic thinking and presented as necessary and inevitable, ultimately imposing rules shaped by those who control data, infrastructure and computing power.
    We cannot be satisfied with merely calling for the moralization of machines — the so-called “alignment” of AI with human values — without also having the courage to insist on a further condition: the possibility of openly discussing the ethical frameworks involved and subjecting them to shared standards of social justice. Otherwise, those who control AI will impose their own moral vision, which will become the invisible infrastructure of these systems. A more moral AI is not enough if that morality is determined by a few. 

    The impossibility of technology’s moral autonomy is particularly potent given the state of technology and war. 

    Sometimes there is talk of “artificial moral agents,” as if machines were able to distinguish between right and wrong with greater consistency than a human being. Yet moral judgment cannot be reduced to calculation, for it involves conscience, personal responsibility and the recognition of the other as a person. Therefore, it is not permissible to entrust lethal or otherwise irreversible decisions to artificial systems. No algorithm can make war morally acceptable. AI does not remove the intrinsic inhumanity of conflict; indeed it can only bring about conflict more quickly and render it more impersonal, lowering the threshold for resorting to violence, transforming defense into threat prediction and thus reducing victims to data. In this way, it will accustom us to the idea that violence is inevitable and needs only to be optimized. 

    In the end, the encyclical is a meditation on technology, power, and justice.

    Indeed, entrusting an algorithm in practice with the power to select who is worthy or not, without anyone bearing responsibility for that judgment, is to hand over the task of redefining the boundaries of human possibilities….
    From this follows a simple but compelling consequence: we cannot consider AI to be morally neutral. In reality, every technical tool embodies choices and priorities through what it measures, ignores and optimizes, and how it classifies people and situations. If a system is designed or used in a way that treats some lives as less worthy, or excludes them without the possibility of appeal, then it is not merely a tool “to be used well,” since it has already introduced criteria that contradict the inalienable dignity of the human person. For this reason, ethical discernment cannot be limited to asking whether we are using a system for good or bad purposes; it must also examine how that system is designed and what vision of the human person and society is embedded in the data and models that guide it. 
    For AI to respect human dignity and truly serve the common good, responsibility must be clearly defined at every stage: from those who design and develop these systems to those who use them and rely on them for concrete decisions.

    Yes. Responsibility for AI rests not only with its creators but also with every user, with all of us. It is critical to end noting that Leo’s encyclical has much positive and constructive instruction on ways to responsibly use and manage the technologies of the age with transparency, accountability, choice, and justice. 

    At this point, however, a subtle temptation may emerge, namely the thought that the problems are too big and we are too small, and that our choices, therefore, cannot make a difference. This is a polite form of resignation, often disguised as realism. Certainly, not everyone has the same power to make a difference. There are those who govern, make investment decisions, lead institutions, conduct research, educate, produce or provide information, and then there are those who only seem to live their daily lives. Yet, no one is without responsibility. We all have our own areas for action, and it is precisely there — and nowhere else — that we must choose whether to fuel the mentality of force (even if only through indifference, cynicism, lies or hatred), or to preserve the mindset of peace (with truth, moderation, closeness and care).

    Amen.

  • Ted Turner

    We will not see Ted Turner’s visionary likes again. He broke free of the bounds of broadcast scarcity and recognized the opportunity to use satellite and cable to build national–then international–networks and brands: not just CNN but his “superstation.” He invented 24-hour news.

    Out of nonstop, round-the-clock news came a host of good–and bad–outcomes. We had news on demand, the ability to witness events as they happened with journalists the world around, a new Times Square ticker to gather ’round. Turner invented a genre and industry copied in many nations.

    The bad? I’d argue 24-hour-news was the original doomscrolling, addicting us to Turner’s screen before Jobs’. CNN begat its evil twin, Fox, and all its ails. And 24-hour-news skewed our–the public’s and journalists’–sense of perspective and priority, making us see news as an endless stream.

    Neil Postman and James Carey legendarily analyzed the impact of the telegraph on society: irrelevance made relevant; instantaneity valued over consideration; regional voices flattened into a national sameness. 24-hour-news accelerated all that, alongside its children, the internet and now AI. From my book, The Gutenberg Parenthesis:

    I’m saddened that Turner lost control of his child, CNN, in the epochal mess that was AOL-Time-Warner. Now I hate to think what might happen to it under the thumb of the Ellisons and the likes of Bari Weiss as state media. Ted will be spinning in his grave.

    But let us take this moment to pay tribute to Ted Turner and his vision–for media, for democracy, for peace, and the planet.

  • Habermas and his coffeehouses

    Jürgen Habermas has died. In memory of the great philosophical provocateur, is a section of my book, The Gutenberg Parenthesis, grappling with his idea of the public sphere and the coffeehouse.

    Writing and conversation came together in a new institution built for the purpose: the coffeehouse. There, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially in England, varied constituencies and classes gathered to drink the exciting, imported brew as they discussed what they read in newspapers, newsletters, and books. Jürgen Habermas theorized that the coffeehouses of England and salons of France were the birthplace of the bourgeois public sphere — in his definition as an inclusive society gathered to share private opinions publicly and to hold rational and critical debate over issues of common concern in the newly available commodity of news. Thus, he said, they established themselves as a public distinct from the state.

    Habermas’ thesis was challenged by, among others, a five-year academic collaboration called the Making Publics Project, organized by McGill University Shakespeare scholar Paul Yachnin. The project’s academics focused not on a singular public sphere. Instead, they examined the creation of plural publics, “forms of association built on the shared interests, tastes, and desires of individuals, most of them ordinary ‘private’ people. The project argued that public making was enabled by new media and new cultural forms and was nested in an emerging market in cultural goods.” They concluded that publics formed not only in coffeehouses and around news. Publics formed around books and pamphlets — as when Luther chose to publish in vernacular German, addressing and forming a public with his ideas. Publics formed in the Globe Theatre as an audience watched Hamlet, with Shakespeare “seemingly able to unite them as a group invited to think through a problem and to form a judgment along with the protagonist,” said Yachnin. Publics would form around portraiture and maps, as people of a given location and culture could understand their place in the world. Publics formed around printed ballads and sermons. Publics formed around languages, around laws, around ideas — making, in the words of Benedict Anderson “imagined communities.” Richard Helgerson, a guiding light of the Making Publics Project, was inspired to write his book Forms of Nationhood by this single sentence in a letter by Edmund Spenser in 1580: “For why a God’s name may not we, as else the Greeks, have a kingdom of our own language?” Or a kingdom of our own culture or religion or gender or worldview, a community or kingdom of our definition and making?

    “To live together in the world,” wrote Hannah Arendt, “means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it.” Publics and communities are often thought of in terms of space: a boundary around a town, a state, a nation. Arendt’s metaphor of the table appeals as it brings to mind the discourse of those seated around — and makes us ask who is and is not given a place there. “A public sphere comprises an indefinite number of more or less overlapping publics,” said Craig Calhoun, “some ephemeral, some enduring, and some shaped by struggle against the dominant organization of others.” Michael Warner developed his theory of counterpublics around the notion that some publics “are defined by their tension with a larger public.” Nancy Fraser made the concept concrete: Alongside the bourgeois public “there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, and working-class publics. Thus there were competing publics from the start, not just in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Habermas implies.”

    Habermas called the Early Modern public of the coffeehouse inclusive, for it allowed people who otherwise would not have met in conversation to sit at the same table — in fact, they were required to, as the historian of the venue, Markman Ellis, recounted: “Arriving in the coffee-house, customers were expected to take the next available seat, placing themselves next to whoever else has come before them. No seat could be reserved, no man might refuse your company. This seating policy impresses on all that in the coffee-house all are equal. Though the matter of seating may appear inconsequential, the principle of equality this policy introduced had remarkable ramifications in the decades to come. From the arrangement of its chairs, the coffee-house allowed men who did not know each other to sit together amicably and expected them to converse.” New norms were required in increasingly urbanized England. “In the anonymous context of the city, in which most people are unknown to each other, this sociable habit was astonishing. Furthermore, the principle of equality established by the seating arrangements recommended equality and openness as the principle of conversation.” Even in the midst of civil upheaval, royalists sat with Puritans (who preferred the temperance of coffee, tea, and chocolate over taverns’ beer). Early on, coffeehouses were inhabited by a “virtuoso culture” that emphasized “civility, curiosity, cosmopolitanism, and learned discourse,” said Brian Cowan in The Social Life of Coffee.

    London’s most celebrated coffeehouse was Will’s, where England’s first poet laureate, John Dryden, would hold court. There a twelve-year-old Alexander Pope was brought to hear him. There, too, diarist Samuel Pepys would come to catch news and gossip. “Under no roof was a greater variety of figures to be seen,” wrote Thomas Babington Macaulay. “There were earls in stars and garters, clergymen in cassocks and bands, pert Templars, sheepish lads from universities, translators and index-makers in ragged coats of frieze. The greatest press was to get near the chair where John Dryden sat.”

    As coffeehouses spread in London after the first opened there in 1652, subcultures emerged within and among the houses. Some had a single table for all, and others had multiple tables or booths where people of like interest could congregate. In the Chapter Coffeehouse, one booth was occupied by the Wet Paper Club, so-called because they would wait to receive the day’s newspaper wet (not hot) off the press. Macaulay listed one coffeehouse for medical men; another for Puritans “where no oath was heard”; another where Jews, “dark eyed money-changers from Venice and Amsterdam greeted each other”; another for papists where“as good Protestants believed, Jesuits planned over their cups another great fire, and cast silver bullets to shoot the King.” Coffeehouses became known as penny universities because, for the price of drink, one could listen to learned men — Dryden, Christopher Wren, Robert Hooke, Edmund Halley, Robert Boyle, Daniel Defoe, David Hume, Voltaire, Jonathan Swift (who complained, “the worst conversation I ever remember to have heard in my life was that at Will’s Coffeehouse”). Patrons signed up for lessons in languages, dancing, or fencing, or to hear lectures in poetry, mathematics, or astronomy. The change in social norms brought by the coffeehouse was significant, shifting social interaction away from the expectation of arranging formal visits in homes to suddenly being able to drop by a place where everybody knows your name.

    It sounds idyllic, the coffeehouse of the period, filled with a diversity of souls able to mix and converse and discern and learn. That image and that standard of discourse is enough to shame us for the quality of conversation we have in our coffeehouse online, where rancor rules. Ah, but it was at Will’s where Pope was assaulted outside “by a gang of ruffians who had not taken kindly to his latest poetic satires.” Coffeehouses were blamed for the ruin of English intellectual life: “‘the decay of study, and consequently of learning,’ was due to ‘coffy houses, to which most scholars retire and spend much of the day in hearing and speaking of news [and] in speaking vily of their superior,’” complained Oxford’s Anthony Wood. Oxford and Cambridge each issued rules forbidding students from frequenting coffeehouses without protection of their tutors. “More than once, the coffeehouse was compared to Noah’s ark, receiving ‘Animals of every sort’ or both ‘the clean and the unclean,’” wrote Lawrence Klein, quoting The Character of a Coffee House from 1673.

    In Habermas’ rather kumbaya view, the coffeehouse, “far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether” and therefore created “a more inclusive public of all private people, persons who — insofar as they were propertied and educated — as readers, listeners, and spectators could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to discussion.” His “insofar” is immensely limiting, including the propertied and educated but excluding women, “people of mean fortune,” and untold undesirables. Women of the time protested, presenting The Women’s Petition Against Coffee, representing to public consideration the grand inconvenience accruing to their sex from the excessive use of the drying and enfeebling Liquor. Nancy Fraser made a compelling feminist argument against Habermas’ presumption of a public sphere there: “We can no longer assume that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere was simply an unrealized utopian ideal; it was also a masculinist ideological notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule. . . . In short, is the idea of the public sphere an instrument of domination or a utopian ideal?”

    Habermas idealized not only the composition of coffeehouse clientele but their discussion, building his thesis on the belief that their debate was rational and critical. Cowan alleged that Habermas engaged in a tautology of sorts, accepting descriptions of the culture in British coffeehouses from Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s publications, which themselves tried to mold that culture. Their journals were read in coffeehouses, their content was debated there, and these conversations were in turn reported and critiqued in their pages. “In the Tatler, the Spectator, and the Guardian, the public held up a mirror to itself,” Habermas wrote.

    Habermas’ mirror was gilded, said Cowan, for “it was difficult to find this ideal public sphere in the real coffeehouses of London. Herein, then, lay much of the import and the urgency of Addison’s claim that his Mr. Spectator desired to be known as the one who ‘brought philosophy out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables and in coffee-houses.’ In other words, he wanted to make the coffeehouses safe for philosophy and to do so required that they be purged of the vice, disorder, and folly that Mr. Spectator so often observed within them.” Cowan said the ideal public sphere painted by the Spectator “was a carefully policed forum for urban but not risqué conversation, for moral reflection rather than obsession with the news of the day, or the latest fashions, and for temperate argument on affairs of state rather than heated political debate. In other words, it was not envisioned as an open forum for competitive debate between ideologies and interests, but rather as a medium whereby a stable sociopolitical consensus could be enforced through making partisan political debate appear socially acceptable in public spaces such as coffeehouses or in media like periodical newspapers.” The public sphere of the coffeehouse was aspirational more than documented.

    If coffeehouses were such paragons of politeness and civility, there’d have been no need for proprietors to post rules such as these in a 1674 broadside reproduced in Aytoun Ellis’ The Penny Universities: A History of the Coffee Houses. It would not be such a bad set of rules for Facebook and Twitter.

    First, Gentry, Tradesmen, all are welcome hither,
    And may without Affront sit down Together:
    Pre-eminence of Place, none here should Mind,
    But take the next fit Seat he can find:
    Nor need any, if Finer Persons come,
    Rise up for to assign to them his Room;
    To limit men’s Expence we think not fair,
    But let him forfeit Twelve-pence that shall Swear;
    He that shall any Quarrel here begin,
    Shall give each Man a Dish t’ Atone the Sin;
    And so shall He, whose Complements extend
    So far to drink in COFFEE to his Friend;
    Let Noise of loud Disputes be quite forborn,
    No Maudlin Lovers here in Corners mourn,
    But all be Brisk, and Talk, but not too much.
    On Sacred things, Let none presume to touch,
    Nor Profane Scriptures, nor sauciley wrong
    Affairs of State with an Irreverent Tongue:
    Let Mirth be Innocent, and each Man see
    That all his Jests without Reflection be;
    To keep the House more Quiet and from Blame,
    We Banish hence Cards, Dice and every Game:
    |Nor can Allow of Wagers that Exceed
    Five Shillings, which oft-time much Trouble
    Breed Let all that’s lost, or forfeited, be spent
    In such Good Liquor as the House doth vent
    And Customers endeavour to their Powers,
    For to observe still seasonable Howers.
    Lastly, let each Man what he calls for Pay,
    And so you’re welcome to come every Day.

    My quarrel with Habermas’ idealized public sphere is that he set a standard impossible for modern conversation to attain. A fall from conversational grace is a useful device by which to fault mass media, capitalism, and the welfare state for the shortcomings of democratic society. But what if the public conversation was never so lofty? What if it has not fallen? Cowan said that “the pretense of coffeehouse civility might easily dissolve into mob violence. These fears of civil society gone awry continued to haunt understandings of the role of the coffeehouse in English society from its inception well into the eighteenth century. They were well-founded fears. The coffeehouses were indeed a primary venue for the distribution of false rumors, seditious libels, and political organizing.” Mark Pendergrast reported that English coffeehouses were often “chaotic, smelly, wildly energetic, and capitalistic.” That is precisely what appeals to me about the real coffeehouse (versus Habermas’) as a metaphor for the public conversation online today: It is inclusive but imperfectly. It aspires to be intelligent and informed yet so often fails, turning nasty and occasionally violent. The net is all that: chaotic, smelly, wildly energetic, and capitalistic and sometimes also intelligent and convivial and warm. The net, like the coffeehouse, is merely human. In 2022, Habermas himself commented at last on the advent of the internet, calling it “a caesura in the development of media in human history comparable to the introduction of printing.” He acknowledged that “at first, the new media seemed to herald at last the fulfillment of the egalitarian- universalist claim of the bourgeois public sphere to include all citizens equally.” At first, at least.

    In each of these two eras — Early Modern coffeehouse and present-day net — a new institution threw people together who were not accustomed to interacting and did not yet have the mutual understanding as well as the norms and rules to govern their intercourse. Lawrence Klein explained that in its day, the aristocracy had set the rules for polite culture. But the opening of the first coffeehouse in Oxford in 1650 (by a Jewish entrepreneur named Jacob, just as Jews were allowed to resettle in England) came amid revolution, as King Charles I had been beheaded only the year before. Puritans were now in government but challenged by royalists, Catholics, Presbyterians, Quakers, and Anglicans. Without the monarchy to set standards and with much turmoil in the wind, other institutions — publishing, universities, the arts, and even coffeehouses — entered to fill the normative void.

    Today we, too, are leaving a time when venerable institutions — media, the arts, schools, government, religion, the family — had established rules of interaction, but now fail to inform the circumstances of our new means to connect. It’s not just that the old rules may not apply in new environments. It’s also that old rules were imposed by the powerful — white, male, and privileged — upon other sectors of society — among them in America, Black, Latino, LGBTQ+, disabled, immigrant, poor — who did not have seats at the table where standards were set for all. Now the formerly disenfranchised have an opportunity to seek new rules — and those who set the old rules resent their intrusion; when their old ways are criticized, they cry that they have been “canceled.”

    In a perceptive Twitter thread, Regina Rini, a Canadian philosophy professor, identified two forces at work in the debate about debating we are having today.In one corner are those she labeled the Movement for Marginal Protection, who wish to add to the list of exceptions to what is allowed in polite conversation. For example, I’m old enough to remember when calling a grown woman a “girl” was tolerated, albeit through gritted teeth, and then at last that was added to the list of exceptions. Today, we are debating new exceptions about, for example, gendered pronouns or immigration. In the other corner are those who do not wish to expand the list of exceptions and do not like being called out and criticized for failing to follow someone else’s new rule. Those Rini labels the Status Quo Warriors. This process of forging societal norms has gone on forever, only now there are more people taking part in the negotiation. In the age of the coffeehouse, there were rules pasted on the walls, countless manuals for appropriate behavior and conversation, and a place to leave your sword at the door. Online, we are struggling to discern our new rules as the incumbent institutions — media, government, education — blame technology companies for ruining society without addressing their own need to adapt. The technology companies, in turn, are fearful of making rulesthat will be unpopular or hard and expensive to enforce at scale. Into that void lunge trolls and conspiracy theorists who will reign until polite society finally agrees what is acceptable behavior and begins enforcing its norms, shunning the miscreants.

    Inthe coffeehouse, we see the origins of a media industry and its relationship with its public and with authorities. We see, too. the birth of social media of a sort and its relationship with news. Print had been around for two centuries by the time coffeehouses arrived, but newspapers were new and were too expensive to be bought by commoners. Coffeehouses changed that: “The coffeehouse was the place to read broadsides, pamphlets, and periodicals,” said Klein. “As a specifically discursive institution, the coffeehouse should be viewed in the context of the history of discourse and communicative practices in society.” The web of coffeehouses was a mechanism for the distribution not only of drink but of news and information, and for the public conversation around it. “A correspondent to the Spectator noted in 1712 how an untruthful remark made in one morning would fly through the coffeehouses of the city throughout the course of the day,” said Cowan. “The numerous coffeehouses of the metropolis were greater than the sum of their parts; they formed an interactive system in which information was socialized and made sense of by the various constituencies of the city.”

    “Nothing resembling the modern newspaper existed,” noted Macaulay. “In such circumstances, the coffee-houses were the chief organs through which the public opinion of the metropolis vented itself.” Macaulay, who was credited in 1828 with naming the press in the gallery of Parliament “the Fourth Estate of the realm,” said coffeehouse orators deserved the title first. Early Modern England and Europe struggled to find mechanisms to assure credibility while authorities attempted to control the flow of bad information or of information entirely. “Although the coffeehouse carried an air of distinct gentility that set it apart from other common victuallers and public-house keepers,” said Cowan, “the trade also faced a unique image problem as a result of its association with the dissemination of seditious rumors or ‘false news’ among the general populace.” Cowan quoted English lawyer Roger North fretting that “not only sedition and treason, but atheism, heresy, and blasphemy are publicly taught in diverse of the celebrated coffee-houses.”

    It is a testament to the importance of the coffeehouse in English society that even as an institution Puritanical in nature — it was a temperance house with rules of behavior — it survived the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660 and multiple subsequent attempts to shut it down. “They were certainly viewed with grave suspicion by authority which, at times, was apprehensive but was forced to recognize them and respect them as the vox populi,” wrote Aytoun Ellis. “It became increasingly difficult to assert the authority of traditional institutions in this discursive and cultural environment,” said Klein.

    Charles II viewed the coffeehouses as a place to brew sedition alongside coffee. He had his high chancellor propose to the Privy Council the use of spies to snoop on the conversationsthere and to consider a royal proclamation to close them down. The secretary of state rejected the proposal, cautioning that the crown needed revenue from the lucrative excise tax on coffee, and that prohibition would, in Cowan’s words, stir up resentment against the recently reinstalled monarchy. Charles issued proclamations in 1672 against harmful content and rumor-mongering, ordering that “great and heavy Penalties are Inflicted upon all such as shall be found to be spreaders of false News, or promoters of any Malicious Slanders and Calumnies in their ordinary and common Discourses.” In 1673 the government issued a statement through Parliament: “As for coffee, tea, and chocolate, I know no good they do.” In 1675, Charles finally issued a Proclamation for the Suppression of Coffee-Houses:

    Whereas it is most apparent that the Multitude of Coffee-houses of late years set up and kept within this Kingdom . . . have produced very evil and dangerous effects; as well as for the Tradesmen and others do therein misspend much of their time, which might and probably would otherwise be employed in and about their Lawful Callings and Affairs; but also, for that in such Houses, and by occasion of the meetings of such persons therein, divers False, Malicious and Scandalous Reports are devised and spread abroad, to the defamation of His Majesties Government, and to the Disturbance of Peace and Quiet of the Realm, his Majesty hath thought it fit and necessary, That the said Coffee-houses be (for the future) Put down and Suppressed.

    “As soon as the Proclamation was made known there was a great public outcry and men of all parties protested in the most vigorous fashion,” Aytoun Ellis said. The proclamation was withdrawn within ten days and the coffeehouses were allowed to stay open so long as they cooperated in “barring entry to the spies and mischief makers” and would not allow “scandalous papers, books or libels.” Intrigue continued as a spy named Dangerfield set out to hire agents to infiltrate the coffeehouses and spread disinformation about Presbyterian plots. The idea of regulating the coffeehouses did eventually become more popular, Cowan said, “when it was phrased as an assault on the dissemination of ‘false news,’ nearly everyone could rally round the cause of regulating the coffeehouses. The difficulties arose when it came to determining which news was false and what was true, especially in an intense climate of fear of popish and/or nonconformist plots. . . . Insofar as coffeehouses figured in this debate, they appeared as dangerous vectors through which the seditious principles and the false news of one’s political opponents were propagated. At best, they were a necessary evil through which the views of one’s opponents must be countered.” Unbridled talk, fake news, spies, scandals, sedition — fear of Facebook, Twitter, and the net has its precedent in the coffeehouses.

    Coffeehouses were distinctly businesses. They partnered with booksellers to offer books. They, like early American newspapers, sold patent medicines from quacks. They were involved in the slave trade as a place to leave messages regarding the sale or capture of enslaved people. When the coffeehouse came to England, the office as workplace still did not exist, so business was often done over tables in the coffeehouse, “which satisfied the functions of mailroom, boardroom, desk space, and, of course, cafeteria.” Lloyd’s Coffeehouse played host to ship auctions and to insurance merchants, soon charging them ten guineas a year for the privilege of working there, eventually becoming the insurance marketplace Lloyd’s of London. Its proprietor, Edward Lloyd, also started publishing a newspaper, Lloyd’s News, covering primarily mercantile matters but also the affairs of Parliament, which led to official displeasure and the end of the publication in 1697. It was replaced in 1734 with Lloyd’s List, a maritime intelligence publication, in addition to Lloyd’s Register, started in 1760; both still operate online.

    Publishers and coffeehouses coexisted in a not-always-happy symbiotic relationship. The first English newspaper arrived fifteen years after the first coffeehouse, with the founding of The Gazette, an official newspaper, in 1665. They then grew together. Coffeehouse patrons expected to read and discuss newspapers (licensed or otherwise), newsletters, and journals, such as Tatler and the Spectator, with the price of their coffee. This was an expense the coffeehouse proprietors came to resent. So they ganged together and planned to publish their own sheet, the coffeehouse Gazette. In the pamphlet The Case of the Coffee Men Against the Newswriters, the proprietors complained of “an intolerable grievance that newspapers were choked with advertisements, and filled with foolish stories picked up at all places of public entertainment, including the ale-houses; and ‘persons are employed — one or two for each paper — at so much a week to haunt coffee houses, and thrust themselves into companies where they are not known . . . in order to pick up matter for the papers.’” So reported Edward Forbes Robinson in his 1893 The Early History of Coffee Houses in England.

    Coffeehouses were indeed sources of publishers’ news. In Button’s Coffee House, Addison and Steele installed a lion’s head with a large, open mouth, designed by William Hogarth, as a repository for letters, reports, limericks, and whatever customers wished to submit for their periodicals. In competition, the coffeehouse cartel proposed to provide its own slates and pencils “to be filled by gentlemen frequenters of the house with such articles as each may be able to afford. . . . Such is the somewhat primitive proposal by which the public are to write their own newspapers.” Cheekily, the proprietors even called for “a joint understanding between the English nation and the Coffee House Masters” for “the sole right of intelligence” — that is, a monopoly over news. The plan came to naught.

    The network of coffeehouses depended on publishers for what we would call content. The publishers depended on the coffeehouse for what we would think of as distribution. The jealous relationship between them was that of “frenemies,” as publishers and platforms gratingly say today. All the while, government stood uneasily by, unable to control what authorities saw as the unfettered flow of false news as well as opinion and complaint. Habermas’ public sphere was not invented in the coffeehouses. Neither was the conversation there as civil as he imagined. But conversation found a home there, just as it finds its new home online, with all the tensions and joys we should expect.

    “Republics require conversation, often cacophonous conversation, for they should be noisy places.” So said the late Columbia Professor James Carey, a scholar of communication as culture. Carey understood, better than anyone I have read, the primacy of conversation in our conception of the public and of the role of the press in it. He informs my thinking about what kind of conversation we should strive for in this time of the universal press….